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Bibliography 361. Introduction: The Reemergence of Dogmatic Liberalism
From the 194O's until the late 196O's,the unchallenged
ruler of the intellectual kingdom of economics was a para-
digm which - for lack of a better name - we shall simply
call mainstream economics. Broadly speaking, mainstream
economics may be described as a well-composed menu of quite
distinct analytical tool-boxes which are eclectically used
to solve the relevant problems at hand: neoclassical theory
in the microeconomic domain, keynesian theory in the macro-
economic domain, and paretian welfare theory in the domain
of normative economics.
For a long time, this menu gave economists the unique com-
fort of grasping the best of all worlds, i.e. to favour
private enterprise, free trade, active stabilization policy,
public regulation of industries, and extensions of the
welfare state all at the same time, without running into
too obvious inconsistencies. Not surprisingly, the ideo-
logical gospel of mainstream economics turned out to be a
kind of pragmatic (or soft) liberalism which found its
political counterpart in the rise of a social democratic
(or populistic) consensus in Europe and, after J.F. Kennedy,
something like a Great Society consensus in the U.S.
Since the early seventies, the intellectual climate among
economists has changed significantly. There is now a wide-
spread disillusionment with the (still) ruling orthodoxy
which can neither adequately explain the secular unemploy-
ment and the slack of growth in many countries of the western
world, nor indicate any clearcut direction of reform; even
worse, the failure of the system has been partly ascribed
This paper was presented at the seminar of Professor
Giersch on the methodology of economics in June 19 84.
Thanks are due to the participants of this seminar, above
all Patrick Tanghe, for providing new ideas on the
subject.- 2 -
to the advice of mainstream economists who had, by and
large, warmly welcomed or at least not staunchly opposed
the rise of mixed economies along neoclassical/keynesian/
paretian lines.
Naturally, competing paradigms have gained ground. On the
progressive/radical side of the political spectrum, the
so-called post-keynesian school has evolved as a serious
threat to the keynesian/neoclassical orthodoxy. On the
liberal-conservative side, a modern form of dogmatic liber-
alism has emerged as a challenge to mainstream economics
and pragmatic liberalism. In this paper, we shall call an
economist a dogmatic liberal whenever his economic policy
advice is strongly biased towards preserving or establishing
- a maximum (negative) freedom of choice and action for
consumers, producers and entrepreneurs,
- a minimum tax-, welfare-, and interventionist state,
and
- a stable, rule-bound institutional framework (including
the monetary regime) which is not subject to any dis-
cretionary political decisions.
Needless to emphazise, these criteria are too vague to yield
an operational definition of the term in question;
instead, they should be regarded as necessary conditions
which have to be met before somebody can sensibly be called
a dogmatic liberal. Historicallyydogmatic liberalism has its
roots in the ideas and writings of the classical British
liberals of the 18./19. centuries from Adam Smith to John
Stuart Mill; institutionally it is today represented by the
Mont Pelerin Society (M.P.S.).
We shall not discuss the ideas of this school any further.
For a valuable survey of post-keynesian economics, see
Davidson (1981).
2
Note that a dogmatic liberal in our sense is not identical
to a "libertarian" if we confine the latter term to those
economists - like David Friedman (see D. Friedman 19 73) -
who take an anarcho-capitalist stance. The main difference
is that anarcho-capitalists even deny the need for a
publicly provided institutional framework.— 3 —
Clearly, dogmatic liberalism cannot be consistently advo-
cated without acceptance of the premises of methodological
individualism, i.e. the view that all phenomena should be
traced back to their foundation in individual behaviour.
Naturally,methodological individualism fosters a deep sus-
picion of statistical aggregates (such as national income)
which can only be reduced to the decisions of individual
agents under very restrictive assumptions. Thus dogmatic
liberals use to share a strong reluctance to accept any
genuine macroeconomic analysis as long as it is not firmly
rooted in microeconomic theory. Not surprisingly, then,
dogmatic liberals turn out to be anti-marxians and anti-
keynesians not only with respect to their policy prescrip-
tions, but also with respect to methodology.
On the other hand, the aversion to "holistic" macroeconomics
goes along with a stronger reliance on microeconomic tools.
In fact, with respect to microeconomics, dogmatic liberals
usually share a fair amount of methodological optimism, i.e.
a belief that microeconomics is an exceptionally powerful
tool-box for analyzing social phenomena, even if these
phenomena are not obviously reducible to a straightforward
cost-benefit-calculus on the part of the acting agents;
many dogmatic liberals would be inclined to regard micro-
2
economics as the uncrowned queen of the social sciences.
Apart from this common methodological basis the camp of
dogmatic liberals is thoroughly devided on methodological
Note that the reverse does not necessarily hold: Anti-
liberal policy proposals may well be derived from models,
of society which are free of holistic notions.
2
Incidentally, this pro-micro-view has been institutionalized
in the form of the Institute of Economic Affairs (I.E.A.),
London, which was founded in 19 57 with the declared inten-
tion of featuring and promoting microeconomic analysis. The
I.E.A.'s board of directors and its advisory council are
clearly dominated by dogmatic liberals.- 4 -
issues. Two schools of thought stand out both in quantative
and in qualitative importance: The Austrian School and the
Chicago School. A glance at the 1983 membership list of the
M.P.S. reveals that adherents to either school make up a
significant number of the most prominent M.P.S.-members
(living and deceased): Economists inclined to Austrian ideas
include James Buchanan, Gerold O'Driscoll jr., John Egger,
Friedrich Hayek, William H. Hutt, Isreal Kirzner, Frank Knight
(f), Ludwig Lachmann, S.C. Littlechild, Fritz Machlup (f) ,
Ludwig von Mises (+), Murray Rothbard, Louis Spadaro, Leland
Yeager; economists inclined to Chicago ideas include Armen
Alchian, Gary Becker, Karl Brunner, Ronald Coase, Harold
Demsetz, David Friedman, Milton Friedman, Jack Hirshleifer,
William Landes, David Meiselmann, Sam Peltzman, Pascal Salin,
George Stigler, Roland Vaubel.
It is the purpose of this paper to illuminate the differ-
ences of these schools with respect to three fundamental
methodological issues, namely
- the status of the postulate of economic rationality
(section 3),
- the scope and relevance of equilibrium economics (sec-
tion 4), and
- the purpose and limits of empirical research in economics
(section 5).
We shall argue that - despite their obvious ideological
similarities - the two schools find themselves close to the
opposite ends of an imaginary continuum of economists ordered
according to their methodological views on these issues. In
each of the sections 3-5 we shall juxtapose and evaluate the
basic views of both schools on the issue at hand. Naturally,
our account of the school's positions will be a stylized
one which cannot and should not do justice to the subtleties,
of any individual scholar's views. The paper will close with
a few remarks on how two schools so vastly different on
methodological grounds end up with almost identical policy- 5 -
prescriptions, namely a• fervent plea-'for laissez-faire:
The paper does not contain any original research; it is
merely a summary of what the author thinks to be the-dis-
tinguishing methodological features" of' both schools.
 !
Before moving to the discussion of the seperate methodolo-
gical- issues, let us briefly cirmumscribe' what we'.mean by
'Austrian School
1 and 'Chicago School
1 . ' "'•'•
2i 'What is Meant by -'Austrian School
1-'arid 'Chicago School
9?'
Under the label 'Austrian School" V-we bind/together
views of those economists whose methodological stance dis-
plays a common intellectual- debt to the two Viennese eco- '
:
nomists Carl Menger ^('especially his famous "Untersuchungeri ~
iiber die Methode der Sozialwisserischaften", 1883) and
Friedrich Wieser. ... The .immediate, intellectual fathers of,,
the modern Austrian School are Ludwig von Mises, a pupal,.;,•
of Friedrich Wieser, and Friedrich von Hayek, himself a
-•:•••
::.--. -. : <•?.".•..•;. ; >'•••.- z- \;..-.? v. • ..,:. •. '• '" I": '.o:r- 3.G.J -
pupil of von Mises, both native Austrians who later emi-
2 •
 :zr,lj
grated to England and the U.S. respectively. The center of
the- modern- Austrian;'^school- h'asv'become New York University
1,
1
with Israel Kirzner, Ludwig Lachmann, Murray Rothbard aifdV to
a lesser extent, Fritz Machlup as their main repres.ent.ative.s^.
Significantly Austrian ideas can also be found in the workj, ;.•
(.of. Lionel Robbins, F.rank. Knight .(above all, Knight 19 56>;).;,-?;C,O
despite -the fact that he.^as^professor^ at the University of.,-
Chicago. - and James Buchanan .(especially Buchanan 1979)r. •^H..-,
•-.>••




;fr'om today's '-point 'o
:het-eV
;-
;fr'om today's '-point 'of
 ;iXi
O
,f.yiew,,.. his ideas o,n me.th.pdo^9-9Yf -„-
w.h
ef,
e; .neither distinctive •->,-,
nor particularly Austrian in'" spirit'
1" (see Hutchison,'" 19 81,
pp. 203 if.)'i-,i.3i'i '
rL ••{•i:;^y-;J o£ ?joari::;~ U\-JJ •-.*••'' >-<o H!>I^'~%:U:--- v/s!i ti
Notetfchat: 'Joseph-A.j S'Ghumpeter
 !'cankbt b
!e 'regarded -as' -
[a>>oa:rsin
genuine Austrian economist since his views on methodology
do not reflect an Austrian heritage.- 6 -
Under the label 'Chicago School
1 we summarize the common
methodological views of the Economics Faculty at the
University of Chicago in the post-Frank-Knight-era, be-
ginning in the late 194O's after the appointment of Milton
Friedman as full professor. The post-Frank-Knight-era may
be subdivided into two periods, namely the era of Milton
Friedman spanning from his famous methodological essay
(Friedman 1953) to the views of the first generation of
monetarists (including non-faculty members, such as Karl
Brunner and Alan Meltzer), and the post-Friedman-era
starting sometime in the early seventies with the matura-
tion of a distinct Chicago view in microeconomics (Becker
1976, Stigler & Becker 1977) and the emergence of the new
classical macroeconomics through the work of Robert Lucas,
Thomas Sargent, Neil Wallace, and Robert Barro at the
Universities of Chicago, Minnesota,and Rochester.
When dealing with either school, we shall focus on the
most modern views; quite frequently, however, we shall have
to flash back on the older ideas in order to recognize how
the particular paradigm has evolved and what the likely
future path of it will be.
3. The Status of the Rationality Postulate
There is a broad consensus among economists that, to yield
any meaningful propositions, economic analysis has to be
based on some rationality postulate, i.e. on some minimum
requirement of internal consistency of individual agents'
choices. In modern microeconomic textbooks, these require-
ments are embodied in the standard optimization procedures:
all economic agents are assumed to maximize some objective
function subject to some resource constraint. In particular,
it is assumed that consumers maximize a utility function
subject to a budget (or time) constraint, and producers
maximize profits subject to a technology constraint.- 7 -
While the need for a rationality postulate is beyond ques-
tion, its logical (or empirical) status remains a matter
of dispute, with Austrian and Chicago economists taking
virtually opposite positions.
3.1. The Austrian View: Apriorism
The most lucid expression of the Austrian view is still to
be found in Lionel Robbins' classical methodological essay:
"The propositions of economic theory, like all scientific
theory, are obviously deductions from a series of postu-
lates. And the chief of these postulates are all assump-
tions involving in some way simple and indisputable facts
of experience relating to the way in which the scarcity of
goods which is the subject matter of our science actually
shows itself in the world of reality. The main postulate
of the theory of value is the fact that individuals can
arrange their preferences in an order, and in fact do so."
(Robbins, 1935, p. 78 f)
And:
"... in the last analysis it reduces to this, that we can
judge whether different possible experiences are of equiva-
lent or greater or less importance to us. From this ele-
mentary fact of experience we can derive the idea of the
substitutability of different goods, of the demand for one
good in terms of another, of an equilibrium distribution of
goods between different uses, of equilibrium of exchange
and the formation of prices." (Robbins, 19 35, p. 75)
Thus the assumption of economic rationality is considered
to be true by introspection, i.e. by the simple fact that,
as human beings, we are able to recognize and verify that
all our fellow human beings do value goods according to some
implicit (and consistent) preference ordering. This posi-
tion is usually called apriorism, a term which is only cor-
rectly applied if we define the act of introspection not as
a part of experience (a posteriori), but as an act of non-
empirical insight or understanding. In fact, the Austrian
School adheres to the so-called Verstehen-doctrine which
postulates a category of understanding outside the range of- 8 -
(empirical) experience. Again, this is best brought out by
Lionel Robbins when comparing the methods of social and
natural sciences:
"In Economics, ... , the ultimate constituents of our funda-
mental generalisations are known to us by immediate acquain-
tance. In the natural sciences they are known only inferen-
tially. There is much less reason to doubt the counterpart
in reality of the assumptions of individual preferences than
that of the assumption of the election. It is true that we
deduce much from definitions. But it is not true that the
definitions are arbitrary." (Robbins, 1935, p. 105)
As this quotation indicates, apriorism along Austrian lines
leads straight on to a methodological demarcation line bet-
ween natural and social sciences, with the latter having
recourse to an additional reliable source of knowledge, "Ver-
stehen", which is not open to the natural sciences; in fact,
the category of "Verstehen" figures as the boundary between
natural and social sciences.
Austrian apriorism is most elaborated, albeit hardly clari-
fied, in the somewhat esoteric writings of Ludwig von Mises
who made it the basis of a new science called praxeology,
i.e. a general theory of human action of which economics is
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only one branch. In praxeology, human action is defined as
"purposive conduct ..., i.e. not simply behaviour, but be-
haviour begot by judgements of value, aiming at a definite
end and guided by ideas concerning the suitability or un-
suitability of definite means." (v. Mises 1977, p. 34)
Translated into ordinary economic language, this statement
should come close to a standard definition of economic
rationality. Again, the apriori truth of economic ration-
ality (in Misean terms: purposeful action) is gained by
introspection:
This idea goes back to Carl Menger (1883), p. 157.
2v. Mises (1949), p. 3.- 9 -
"The starting point of all praxeological thinking is not
arbitrary chosen axioms, but a self-evident proposition,
fully, clearly and necessarily present in every human mind"
(v. Mises, 1977, p. 4), and:
"What we know about our own actions and about those of other
people is conditioned by our familiarity with the category
of action that we owe to a process of self-examination and
introspection as well as of understanding of other peoples'
conduct. To question this•insight is no less impossible than
to question the fact that we are alive"•(v. Mises, 1977,
p. 71)
Needless to emphasize, such a radical apriorist position
implies a fervent rejection of any empirical approach to
the rationality postulate:
"The ultimate yardstick of an economic theorem's correctness
or incorrectness is solely reason unaided by experience."
(v. Mises, 1949, p. 858)
Misean praxeology figures as the most extremist view among
Austrians. Already von Hayek takes a much more moderate
position on introspection and apriorism. This comes out
most clearly in his series of papers "Scientism and the Study
of Society" (1942-44): While he endorses introspection as a
valuable starting-point for any analysis in the social sci-
ences (Hayek, 1942, p. 286 f), he does so primarily to defend
a social science which is exclusively concerned with sub-
jective phenomena against a "scientistic" approach which
refuses to accept subjective values as the ultimate objects
of inquiry. Thus interpreted, his plea for introspection
boils down to a mere case for subjectivism and not a case
for apriorism. In fact, Popper (1979, pp. 107 ff) rightly
refuses to accept Hayek's line of reasoning as a case for
methodological dualism since - once accepted - a purely sub-
jectist social science may treat "values" just as physics
treats, say, elections; incidentally, this is precisely the
path modern (mainstream) microeconomics and general equilib-
rium theory have taken.
Von Hayek has apperently accepted Popper's interpretation of
his views. He now stresses that "the differences between the
two groups of disciplines have... been greatly narrowed"
(Hayek 1967, p. VIII). Hutchison (1981) goes as far as to
distinguish between Hayek I (the pre-Popperian) and Hayek II
(the Popperian).- 10 -
Latter-day Austrians - with the notable exceptions of Murray
Rothbard (Rothbard 1957, 1976) and Mario Rizzo (Rizzo 1978) -
appear to be somewhat lukewarm about the strong aprioristic
claims of (Misean) praxeology. While the validity of the
concept of introspection and purposeful action is never
questioned (see i.a. Kirzner 19 78), there is no significant
further elaboration on the Misean idea of rationality, and
topics related to it are rare on the agendas of the latest
conferences on Austrian economics (see e.g. Dolan (ed.), 1976;
Spadaro (ed.), 1978; Kirzner (ed.), 1982). A recent survey
on Austrian methodology suggests that apriorism should not
be considered as a distinguishing characteristic of the
Austrian School (Egger 1978, p. 19 f). Another recent survey
by one of the most prominent modern Austrian scholars does
not even mention it in a list of "Austrian features" (Kirz-
ner 1981, pp. 115 ff).
3.2. The Chicago View: Instrumentalism
The Chicago view on the rationality postulate and on assump-
tions in economic theory in general was first advanced by
Milton Friedman:
"... the relevant question to ask about the assumptions of
a theory is not whether they are descriptively "realistic",
for they never are, but whether they are sufficiently good
approximations for the purpose in hand. And this question
can be answered only by seeing whether the theory works which
means whether it yields sufficiently accurate predictions."
(Friedman 19 53, p. 15)
Thus Friedman - and the Chicago School in general - regard
the assumption of rationality as a mere working hypothesis to
generate predictions which can be set against empirical ob-
servations; testing a working hypothesis "directly", i.e.
without any recourse to the predictions of a theory derived
from it, is a futile, if not logically impossible excercise.
Note that, in Friedman's language, the term "prediction" is- 11 -
very broad: It covers ex-ante and ex-post forecasts as well
as unconditional and conditional forecasts, i.e. - in the
language of econometric time series analysis - all predic-
tions of a dependent variable beyond the period of parameter
estimation, no matter whether the values for all explanatory
variables are known with certainty or not. (Friedman 1953, p. 9)
Naturally, Chicago economists consider introspection as
empirically meaningless since what we "understand" (in the
Austrian sense) of ourselves and of other human beings is of
no more than incidental help for constructing theories with
falsifiable predictions. In addition, economic agents - con-
sumers as well as businessmen - may be quite unable to ver-
bally describe or even to conciously recognize the rational
pattern behind their economic behaviour, i.e. from the view-
point of the observing economist, they may merely act as if
they were consistently rational optimizers. In the case of
businessmen, this as-if-principle can be rationalized by a
kind of Darwinian survival argument going back to a paper by
Armen Alchian (Alchian 19 50) : In the long-run, only those
businessmen using least-cost production techniques will sur-
vive in the competitive struggle so that those remaining in
2
business can confidently be assumed to maximize profits.
Evidently, there is no scope for a methodological dualism in
this view since theories are considered as mere instruments
in all sciences. In fact, Milton Friedman (and other Chicago
economists) are highly optimistic with respect to the con-
vergence of methods: While Friedman recognizes some gradual
differences between physical and social sciences - above all
the impossibility of (almost) completely controlled experi-
ments in the latter -, he does not see any essential methodo-
logical rift between them. (Friedman 1953, pp. 4 ff)
1See also Friedman (1953), pp. 22 f; Becker (1962), p. 164.
An analogous argument applies to consumers: those who per-
sistently bend down to erratic impulses or inertia may not
be able to reach any self-imposed target level of consump-
tion and will not be fit for any long-term struggle for sur-
vival. Severe mental illness may be a good case in point.- 12 -
While the Friedman essay has become the target of much well-
pointed criticism on logical grounds , its endorsement of
Chicago-style-instrumentalism still stands: the assumption of
rationality as a mere tool to generate meaningful predictions,
or, even more concisely, a sufficient, but not a necessary condi-
2
tion for deducing the propositions of economic theory.
This instrumentalist view has found a striking theoretical
corroboration through a much neglected paper by another
Chicago economist (Becker 1962). He showed that the funda-
mental law of microeconomics - income compensated demand
curves for a single product are downward sloping - can be
derived without any recourse to the assumption of individual
rationality.
His main point is straightforward : Assuming that any single
consumer acts irrationally (or better: arationally ) , i.e.
given his budget constraint, he chooses his consumption
bundle at random , the average consumer (or precisely: the con-
sumer with mean consumption of each good and mean income)
will find himself very close to the middle of his budget line
since the law of large numbers ensures that "extreme" choices
cancel out up to a small residuum. Any income compensated
relative price changes mean a rotation of the budget plane
in goods space, i.e. a change in the relative scarcity of at
least some goods; while any individual consumer continues
I.a. the outstanding critiques by Nagel (1963) and Melitz
(1965). Following Melitz, I see the most striking ambiguity
in Friedman's usage of the terms "indirect" vs. "direct"
testing. Friedman apparently overlooks the fact that even
a "direct" test such as asking businessmen whether they
maximize profits is not direct in the (logical) sense that
no auxiliary assumptions are involved.
2
This is the main message of Boland (1979).
Becker also proves his case for an extreme sort of inert
behaviour, for arational producers, and for technically in-
efficient random choice.BlbMothek de® Instttats - 13 -
fflr Weltwirtsdiaft Ktol
to distribute his (unchanged) income randomly at the new
relative prices, the average consumer (and thus the whole
economy of arational consumers) will almost, certainly con-
sume more of the "cheaper" goods and less of the "more ex-
pensive" goods than before, simply because he remains very
close to the middle of his resource constraint and thus
cannot "escape" its rotation.
Clearly, then, individual rationality is a sufficient, but
not a necessary condition for aggregate consumer demand to
behave in the way the fundamental law of microeconomics
1 2 predicts. ' The Chicago-type conclusions are thoroughly
instrumentalist: We could do without the assumption of in-
dividual rationality; on the other hand, we can be all the
more confident in the assumption of individual rationality
since, even if it is not met, the predictions made on basis
of it still hold, and it is only the predictions of micro-
economics (the fundamental law of demand) which are of interest.
Not surprisingly, then, Chicago economists went on to base
their theories on the rationality postulate.
Of course, the Becker-type arationality is itself an ex-
treme case, but as long as nobody has supplied a more
"realistic" model of a rational/irrational mixture, there
is no point in questioning the power of Becker's results.
The burden of proof now lies with the critics.
Kirzner (1962) has critizised Becker for having neglected
the equilibrium process of price formation which may well
require at least some rationality on the part of the
acting agents. While Kirzner's argument is correct in
its own "Austrian" right, it mistakes the scope of Becker's
analysis: Neoclassical microeconomics does not have a
theory of the process of price formation and neither has
Becker. Thus Kirzner's critique of Becker's analysis is
much more a critique of neoclassical theory in general (see
section 4.1.).- 14 -
3.3. Evaluation
From a philosopher's perspective, the gap between the two
schools' views on economic rationality is fundamental:
Introspective apriorism and instrumentalism are and remain
irreconcilable antitheses. To the economist, however, this
gap may not matter much as long as he cannot discriminate
between an Austrian- and a Chicago-type research agenda on
basis of the rationality postulate alone. In this respect,
the only real programmatic difference appears to be that
instrumentalism does and introspective apriorism does not
call rational all non-human or mere reflexive behaviour
which turns out to be formally compatible with constrained
maximization of some objective function; clearly, this is
a practically irrelevant difference because the scope
of economics is restricted to non-reflexive human be-
haviour anyway. On the other hand, there is even a
common programmatic ground of the two schools: Both
reject any behaviourist attempt to test the assumption
of rationality in an experimental setting ; both schools
have great confidence in the power and fruitfulness of the
rationality postulate (and microeconomics in general) and
go on to make extentive use of it. In any event, intro-
spective apriorism is moving to the background of modern
Austrian thinking, and thus we may dare the forecast that
the point for sheer dogmatic debates between apriorists and
instrumentalists (or for that matter: empiricists) will




versus Machlup in the 1950's would appear sterile and
We conclude that, at least from the economist's viewpoint,
it is not the status of the rationality postulate which can
give us a clue to the most relevant paradigmatic rift bet-
wenn Vienna and Chicago. As we shall see in the next sec-
1See Caldwell (1982), pp. 149 ff.
2
For a valuable discussion of this famous controversy, see
Caldwell (1982), pp. 139 ff.- 15 -
tion, the scope and relevance of equilibrium economics
scores much better on this account.
4. The Scope and Relevance of Equilibrium Economics
Standard economic textbooks define the term "general equi-
librium" as the state of an economy where no rational
decision-maker has an incentive to change the allocation
of the resources at his disposal. In terms of demand and
supply notions, general equilibrium is the state of an
economy where the system of relative prices of all com-
modities (including money) is such that there is no excess
demand (excess supply) in any commodity market (including
the money market). Note, that these standard definitions
refer to a static equilibrium, with all decisions being
taken at one point in time. This is true even if the
economy contains future ("dated") goods which enter the
economic agents' calculus at expected prices and appropriately
discounted values; in that case, the decisions over the
future consumption and production pattern are still taken
simultaniously so that we must again speak of a static
equilibrium.
While the need for some equilibrium concept in economies
is beyond question, the theoretical and empirical relevance
of static equilibria as defined above are a matter of dis-
pute. Again, the Austrian and the Chicago School take
virtually opposite views on this matter.
In the following, we shall take general and not partial
equilibrium as the reference notion simply because it is
the most sophisticated concept of equilibrium theorizing.
In any event, the points of disagreement between Austrian
and Chicago economists do not depend on the distinction
between these two equilibrium concepts.- 16 -
4.1. The Austrian View: Process Towards Equilibrium
Austrians are highly critical of the exclusive preoccupation
of mainstream economics with static equilibria. Their
central line of reasoning goes back to the seminal paper
by F.A. von Hayek "Economics and Knowledge" (.1937) . He
argues that the realization"of a static equilibrium price
vector at any point in time does not ensure that the ex-
pectations on which individual economic agents base their
plans and decisions, are mutually compatible and/or borne
out by the facts; within the passage of time, the static
equilibrium may be - and most probably will be - endogenously
disturbed by agents correcting their prior expectational
errors and reallocating their resources accordingly.
Hence there is a second, and in Hayek's view, much more im-
portant concept of equilibrium defined as a state of com-
2
plete compatibility of ex-ante plans. In Hayek's words:
"... we can speak of a state of equilibrium at a point in
time - but it means only that the different plans which the
individuals composing it have made for action in time are
mutually compatible. And equilibrium will continue, once
it exists, so long as the external data correspond to the
common expectations of all the members of the society."
(v. Hayek, 1937, p. 41)
Of course, this Hayekian dynamic equilibrium describes a
situation which will hardly ever be met in the real world.
For Hayek and his Austrian followers it merely serves as
the fictituous endstate to which an economy is perpetually
moving without ever reaching it.
"... the only justification for /"our concern with the
fictituous state of equilibrium^ is the supposed existance
of a tendency toward equilibrium...£which] can hardly mean
Littlechild (1982) shows that the critique of static
equilibrium analysis runs somewhat parallel in the work of
von Mises and von Hayek. We shall exclusively focus on
von Hayek's arguments since they have become the kernel
of modern Austrian thinking.
2Egger (1976), p. 21 .- 17 -
anything but that, under certain conditions, the knowledge
and intentions of the different members of society are
supposed to come more and more into agreement, or ... that
the expectations of the people and particularly of the
entrepreneurs will become more and more correct." (v. Hayek,
1937, pp. 44 f)
The quoted passage points to the core of the Austrian de-
viation from mainstream equilibrium economics: While the
latter is exclusively concerned with analyzing a static
equilibrium or a timeless succesion of static equilibria
("comparative statics"), Austrian economics focuses on the
process of moving towards a dynamic equilibrium in the
Hayekian sense. The market and the whole system of inter-
dependent markets are not viewed as timeless adjustment
mechanisms, but as social institutions which generate new
information and thus allow market participants to gradually
improve their knowledge, correct errors and move to a more
satisfactory economic state of affairs. In fact, the market
as a perpetual process of discovery has been a recurrent
theme in von Hayek's writings.
But what sort of errors are to be corrected and what sort
of discoveries to be made? Or, to put it differently: In
what sense are economic agents assumed to learn? These are
the questions which modern Austrians, above all Israel
2
Kirzner , address. Clearly, the Austrian process of learning
must be outside the realm of mainstream equilibrium theory:
"If, say, imperfection in knowledge resulted from deliberate
unwillingness to incur the costs of search, it is not clear
how we can be confident that, in the course of the market
process such unwillingness will invariably dissipate, or
that the necessary costs of search will invariably fall."
(Kirzner, 1978, pp. 69 f).
To account for learning in a dynamic sense, Kirzner develops
a theory of genuine error which contains the germ for a
•"see i.a. von Hayek (1945, 1946, 1968).
See e.g. Kirzner (1973).- 18 -
definition of entrepreneurship. To understand his main
points, it is worthwhile to quote him at length:
"Surely our justification for asserting the existence of
a tendency for the prices of identical articles to converge
rests on our understanding that the imperfection of know-
ledge (on which one must rely in order to account for the
initial multiplicity of prices) reflects, at least in
part, sheer error. We understand ... that the initial
imperfection in knowledge is to be attributed, not to lack
of some needed resource, but to failure to notice oppor-
tunities ready at hand. The multiplicity of prices re-
presented opportunities for pure entrepreneural profit;
that such multiplicity existed, means that many market
participants (those who sold at the lower prices and those
who bought at the higher prices) simply overlooked these
opportunities. Since the opportunities were left unex-
ploited, not because of unavailable needed resources/ but
because they were simply not noticed, we understand that,
as time passes, the lure of available pure profits can be
counted upon to alert at least some market participants
to the existence of these opportunities. The law of in-
difference follows from our recognition that error exists,
that it consists in available opportunities being over-
looked, and that the market process is a process of the
systematic discovery and correction of true error. The
hypothetical state of equilibrium, it emerges, consists
not so much in the perfection of knowledge (since costs
of acquiring knowledge may well justify an equilibrium
state of ignorance) as in the hypothetical absence of
error." (Kirzner, 1978, p. 70)
Hence, in contrast to mainstream microeconomics, Austrian mi-
croeconomics explicitly allows for genuine errors in the sense
of unexploited profit opportunities; accordingly, the entre-
preneur is broadly defined as any economic agent (consumer or
businessman) who is alert enough to discern and correct errors
and inefficiencies, be it through mere arbitrage or through
(Schumpeterian) innovative activities such as introducing
new productive processes or new products. Of course, neo-
classical economists may define entrepreneurial alertness
In this sense the Schumpeterian innovator may be formally
subsumed under the modern Austrians' broad concept of
entrepreneurship. Needless to say, such a merely formal
interpretation misses the spirit of the writings of Schum^
peter who attached a much deeper sociological content to
the concept of entrepreneurship. See Schumpeter (1912,
1943).- 19 -
as just another economic resource and thus integrate it into
static optimization procedures; to Austrian economists,
such an approach is counterproductive because it sweeps
away the most fertile ground for research:
"... alertness cannot be treated as a resource with respect to
which decisions are made on how to use it, since, in order
to make such a decision with respect to a resource one must
already have been alert to its availability. 'Alertness' thus
appears to possess a primordial role in the decision making
which makes unhelpful for it to be treated, in the analysis
of decisions, 'as any other resource
1." (Kirzner, 1978, pp.
68 f) .
In summary, Austrians place entrepreneurship outside the
static equilibrium framework; hence Austrian^ economics is
genuine disequilibrium theory in the sense that the focus
of research is turned to the simultaneous learning process
of economic agents and the spontaneous order resulting there-
from. In this respect, Austrians find themselves rather
close to the modern post-keynesian school, above all to the
work of G.S.L. Shackle , which also regards information
generating processes as the very essence of economics.
Of course, the dynamic nature of Austrian economics again
raises the question of methodological dualism between natural
and social sciences. An Austrian research programme cannot
simply apply the methods of physics since the acquisition
and processing of knowledge is a specifically human activity
to which the methodology of physics should not be well
suited. Instead an evolutionary approach borrowed from
biology may better fit Austrian research needs.
Shackle (1972) .- 20 -
4.2. The Chicago View: Tight Prior Equilibrium
Chicago economists are inclined to see the world through
the glasses of tight prior equilibrium , i.e. they suggest
that what we observe in the real world is, by and large,
an economy in long-run equilibrium. In particular they
regard
- prices at which individuals currently agree to transact
as market clearing prices, i.e. as prices which are con-
sistent with constrained optimization of all decision
makers,
- marginal products and compensation of identical resources
as to be approximately equal in all uses,
- most individuals as to be price takers, and
- information bearing on prices and quantities as to be
acquired at an economically optimal level.
Chicago economists would not deny that there are many diverse
factors which may disturb the postulated state of long-run
equilibrium; however, they would also make the claim that
these factors are either of minor empirical importance - and
thus do not require more than some ad-hoc theorizing or case
studying -, or they are rather easily incorporated into the
main body of tight prior equilibrium analysis. According to
the typical Chicago judgement, monopolies and other market
failures belong to the first category while price stickiness,
government intervention and all sorts of random disturbances
belong to the more important second category. Price sticki-
ness is explained through the existence of long-term con-
tracts which can be rationalized as expected value maximiza-
tion on the part of private economic agents; government in-
tervention is accounted for by equilibrium models of compe-
The following summary of the Chicago position partly follows
the excellent survey by Melvin Reder (Reder, 1982, pp. 11 ff)— 21 —
tition among pressure groups for political influence which,
eventually will have to supplement the conventional economic
models to yield a general politico-economic equilibrium
theory; random disturbances require stochastic versions of the
general equilibrium models which are expected to reveal
basically the same economic properties as their deterministic
2
counterparts.
Hence, whenever a Chicago economist approaches some economic,
social or political phenomenon to be explained, he invariably
starts out from the assumption that he observes a
state of (prior) equilibrium, with, all profitable oppor-
tunities seized and no further adjustments required. He does
not tautologically deny the existence of any other state,
but he does shift the burden of proof to those who pretend
to recognize some state of disequilibrium in the real world.
While tight prior equilibrium has always been a major in-
gredient of what is today called the Chicago school, the
scope of equilibrium analysis has significantly widened in
recent years. In fact, there is a marked gap between the
older Chicago School around Milton Friedman who made ex-
tensive use of the Marshallian toolbox of partial equilibrium
analysis, and the younger school around Gary Becker in
microeconomics and Robert Lucas/Thomas Sargent in macro-
economics who devote most of their efforts to Walrasian
general equilibrium problems. An obvious example for this
difference can be found in the treatment of institutional
rigidities: While Friedman was still ready to accept price
stickiness as an exogenous constraint without asking whether
it was, in the last resort, compatible with rationality and
overall tight prior equilibrium, the modern Chicago School
See Becker (1983). This line of research is still in its
infancy.
2See Reder (1982), pp. 11 f.
See the well-pointed argument of Hoover (1984).- 22 -
feels obliged to 'go behind any rigidity' and to ask how it
can be reconciled with successful constrained optimization
on the part of £^1. economic (and even political) agents.
The usual procedures to accomplish this reconciliation are
to redefine the variables and/or to add new variables in
the equilibrium model; so far, these new variables have al-
ways been either new objects of choice or new resource con-
straints which could help to account for observed anomalies
To see how this research strategy works in practice, we
shall briefly sketch the central ideas of two modern
branches of Chicago economics: Becker's new theory of con-
sumer behaviour and the new classical macroeconomics.
2
4.2.1. Becker's New Theory of Consumer Behaviour
The starting point for the modern Chicago reformulation of
microeconomics is the limited scope of traditional demand
theory. Whenever some observed phenomenon appears to be
incompatible with constrained optimization and prior equilibrium
of all economic agents, mainstream microeconoinists are in-
clined to explain it by resorting to changes in tastes or
outright irrationality; of course, this catch-all strategy
does not only protect the theory against falsification,
but it also closes the formal apparatus in a way which is
particularly fruitless for economists since tastes and
irrationality are themselves outside the realm of economics.
The only way to lock this analytical emergency exit is to
assume, as Becker does, that all human beings are (or behave
as if they were) successful rational optimizers, and_ that
tastes are the same for all human beings at all times. As
empirical propositions, these are bold claims, but they must
be made if a thoroughly economic approach to human behaviour
In this sense, the Chicago view described at the beginning
of section 4.2. is the modern one.
This subsection draws heavily on Becker & Michael (1973), the
introduction to Becker (1976, 1) and Stigler & Becker (1977).- 23 -
- and not a theory amalgam with some economic and some
catch-all variables - is to be achieved.
Of course, tastes in the common sense meaning of the term,
i.e. tastes for goods available in the market, are manifestly
not identical across individuals so that the traditional
formulation of demand theory cannot do the required job.
Instead, Becker develops a new theory which he aptly calls
the Household Production Function Approach : He assumes that
consumers gain utility out of commodities which they them-
selves produce via a household production function, and that
goods available in the market are only one set of factors
entering this production function, along with the household's
time (i.e. the time left for consumption) and some other
variables representing the environment in which production
takes place. Hence the act of consumption is.conceptually
split off into buying market goods (subject to an income
constraint), and transforming these goods along with, other
production inputs (above all time) into final commodities
to be consumed. These final commodities are presumed to
be just a few rather abstract entities such as nutrition,
entertainment, and social distinction. It is only the
preferences for these basic commodities which are assumed
to be equal for all individuals at all times; thus, all
differences in the consumption pattern of market goods
must be reducible to the genuine economic observation that
"... households respond to changes in the prices and produc-
tivities of factors, to changes in the relative shadow
prices of commodities and to changes in their full real
income as they attempt to minimize their cost of production
and to maximize their utility." (Becker & Michael 1973 ,
p. 139).
A few examples may clarify how Becker's new microeconomics
works in practice.
Becker & Michael (1973), p. 134. For a formal exposition
of this approach, see Becker & Michael (1973), pp. 134 ff,- 24 -
While the traditional theory cannot explain the simple fact
that cross-price-elasticities differ between different
pairs of market goods, Becker's theory can: As market goods
are mere factors used in the production of basic commodities,
we shall expect two market goods to have a relatively high
cross-price-elasticity whenever they are used as substitutes
in the same household production process (e.g. beef and
chicken in the production of nutrition versus pianos in the
production of entertainment).
Traditional theory interprets fashions and fads as changes
in tastes which cannot satisfactorily be explained by mere
economic factors, even with the ad-hoc-support of 'band-
wagon effects'; Becker's theory regards them as the neces-
sarily fluctuating expression of a constant taste for
social distinction which is periodically produced with
different market goods simply because some 'newness' is
technologically required to hold up the marginal produc-
2
tivities of the factors in use.
• v
Traditional theory cannot explain the existence of altruism
or charity except in the non-economic sense that, to some
extent, economic agents have an odd preference for helping
3
others. Becker, in turn, accounts for charity through his
1 rotten-kid-theorem
1 which states that economic agents be-
have altruistically whenever the expected returns from such
seemingly unselfish behaviour exceed its costs; not sur-
prisingly, the returns depend on how strong the social in-
terdependence between donor and donee happens to be so that
a high level of altruism can be predicted to prevail in
1Becker & Michael (1973), p. 140.
2Stig.ler & Becker (1977), pp. 87 ff.
The public good aspects of these tastes form the core of
the non-Chicago (mainstream) economics of charity.- 25 -
small social units such as the family.
In summary, Becker's theory is the microeconomic approach
to human behaviour par excellence: It excludes - probably
to the largest possible logical degree - all non-economic
factors. In microeconomics, it is the peak of what can be
reached with a firm belief in the power of equilibrium
analysis.
2
4.2.2. The New Classical Macroeconomics
A similar peak has been reached in the macroeconomic domain
with the elaboration of the new classical macroeconomics.
The self-set task of the new classicals runs parallel to
Becker's: They want to explain the observed phenomena, above
all the business cycle, within a general equilibrium setting
based on the three Chicago-style assumptions that
- all decisions of economic agents are based on real, not
nominal factors,
- all economic agents are, to the limits of their infor-
mation, consistent and successful optimizers, i.e. they
are continously in equilibrium, and
- economic agents make no systematic errors in evaluating
their economic environment, i.e. they hold rational ex-
pectations.
To build a theory of the business cycle on these three
tenants is considered to be the prime, if not the only task
of macroeconomics. In Lucas' words:
"... one would like a theory which accounts for the observed
movements in quantities (employment, consumption, investment)
as an optimizing response to oberved movements in prices."
(Lucas, 1976, p. 222)
For the details of this model, see Becker (1976, 2), p. 284.
2
This brief subsection draws on Hoover (1984) and Lucas (1976)
3See Hoover (1984), p. 59.- 26 -
Again, any resort to irrationality, inefficiency or dis-
equilibria is regarded as an emergency exist which should be
closed to economists; in this sense, keynesian macrotheory
was a fatal analytical error which, for more than thirty
years, detracted economists from their real task of elabo-
rating a consistant general equilibrium model with no place
for exogenous, i.e. unexplained, price rigidities.
4.2.3. Evaluation
The distance between Vienna and Chicago with respect to the
scope and relevance of equilibrium economics is large and
important, not only to the philosophically oriented metho-
dologist, but also to the practically minded economist. It
is the wide gap between two schools which have for years
moved into opposite paradigmatic directions.
For their own purposes, the Austrians have redefined the
scope of economics. In Austrian eyes, economics is not
the science of choice, but the science of action, or, more
precisely, the science of adjustment to a hypothetical state
of informational equilibrium. The central question for eco-
nomics then is whether, how, and how quickly individuals
become successful entrepreneurs by discerning past errors
and inefficiencies and correcting their resource allocation
accordingly. The answers to these questions may bear on
the ageless controversy over the endogeneous stability of
the private sector, i.e. the question whether private eco-
nomic agents learn fast enough to prevent the economy from
drifting into serious crisis after some unanticipated
exogeneous shock.
Unfortunately, Austrian economics at its present stage of
development looks very much like a "programme without re-
search". While the fundamental points of departure from- 27 -
mainstream economics have been repeatedly formulated , there
has so far been no serious attempt to operationalize the
ideas in a full scale empirical research project. The
Austrian reluctance to plunge into research on informational
processes is probably due to two facts: the traditional
Austrian scepticism concerning empirical research, and the
nature of the required research project itself which would
have to fall into the no man's land between social psychology,
sociology, and economics. Until the Austrians overcome
this reluctance, their programme is stuck.
In the form of tight prior equilibrium theorizing, the
Chicago School has pushed traditional economics (i.e. the
science of choice) up to the limits of its potential. A
single analytical tool, constrained optimization, is presumed
to explain virtually everything, from altruism down to the
business cycle.
A clue to this striking performance may lie in a logical
peculiarity of the Chicago-type-theories: All explanatory vari-
ables which are introduced to drive the machinary of constrained
optimization (such as basic wants, shadow prices, costly
information), and all phenomena which are supposed to be
explained by this machinary are exclusively defined in
terms of the theory itself; there is no independent speci-
fication of the terms in question, neither through another
2
theory nor through pre-theoretical common sense.
With respect to the explanatory variables, this procedure
- albeit vulnerable on the grounds of the philosophy of
See i.a. the three conference volumes Dolan (ed., 1976),
Spadaro (ed., 1978), and Kirzner (ed., 1982).
2
Of course, the meaning of the terms in common sense and in
the theory may, by accident, coincide. Still then, it is only
the theoretical meaning which counts.- 28 -
science - is in line with instrumentalist philosophy to
which, by and large, Chicago economists still subscribe.
With respect to the phenomena to be explained, however, the
procedure is simply curious. Take Stigler & Becker's account
of fashions and fads: By defining them as "short episodes
or cycles in the consumption habits of people" (Stigler &
Becker, 1977, p. 87), they eliminate any common sense or
sociological meaning of genuine waves in tastes and values
which may even be "felt" if people cannot materialize them (such
as a fashion of western clothing in the Soviet Union). Or take
Becker's account of altruism: Common sense and philosophical
usage point to a definition in terms of genuine unselfish-
ness, but Becker must define it in terms of mere observed
behaviour. Or take Lucas
1 important critique of the con-
cept of (keynesian) involuntary unemployment:
"Sentences like 'more labour, as a rule, would be forth-
coming at the existing money wage if it were demanded
1 are
used again and again, as though, from the point of view
of a jobless worker, it is unambiguous what is meant by
'the existing money wage
1. Unless we define an individual's
wage rate as the price someone else is willing to pay him
for his labor (in which case Keynes' assertion above is
defined to be false), what is it? The wage at which he
would like to work more hours? Then it is true by definition
and equally empty." (Lucas 19 78, p. 242)
Lucas is right: In a world of rational optimizers, there
is no such thing as involuntary unemployment, simply because
there cannot be anything involuntary. (If, e.g., non-unionized
workers remain unemployed simply because they do not dare to
undercut de-facto minimum wages set by unions, they voluntarily
accept a constraint on their choice set; of course, they may
not be "happy" - whatever that means -, but they behave ratio-
nally.) And after getting rid of involuntary unemployment,
Lucas proceeds to analyze the phenomenon of business and
employment cycles on the basis of tight prior equilibrium
theory, just as Becker does with fashions, fads and altruism.
For a thorough discussion of this point, see Rosenberg
(1979), pp. 522.- 29 -
Clearly, the whole procedure has a tautological flavour,
and both scholars apparently recognize this as is indicated
by Becker's plea for a useful closed system:
"Of course, postulating the existence of costs closes or
'completes' the economic approach, in the same, almost
tautological, way that postulating the existence of (some-
times unobserved) uses of energy completes the energy system,
and preserves the law of the conservation of energy...
The critical question is whether a system is completed in
a useful way: the important theorems derived from the eco-
nomic approach indicate that it has been completed in a way
that yields much more than a bundle of empty tautologies
in good part because the assumption of stable preferences
provides a foundation for predicting the responses to various
changes." (Becker 19 76, 1, p. 7),
and Lucas
1 plea for a good analogue system:
"... a theory is not a collection of assertions about the
behaviour of the actual economy but rather an explicit set
of instructions for building a parallel or analogue system
- a mechanical, imitation economy. A 'good' model, from
this point of view, will not be exactly more 'real' than a
poor one, but will provide better imitations. Of course,
what one means by a 'better imitation
1 will depend on the
particular question to which one wishes answers." (Lucas,
1980, p. 272)
Thus the modern Chicago School has come a long way from its
positivist tenants in Friedman's methodology to its latest ela-
boration of axiomatic systems which satisfy some vague criteria
of usefulness and goodness. Of course, predictive power still
figures prominently in Chicago rhetoric, but the research empha-
zis has clearly shifted towards preserving the consistency of a
theoretical construction solely based on overall equilibrium.
In this sense, Chicago economics has become a mere interpretation
rather than a theory of the world; or more polemically: an exer-
cise in hermeneutics rather than a genuine effort to explain
observed phenomena. Whether this interpretation yields any
insight in a meta-economic sense is simply beyond the concern
of Chicago economists.
This "lack of meta-economic concern" appears to be a central
problem for non-Chicagoens when they try to evaluate some ex-
treme Chicago-style research programmes: for Blaug (Blaug 19 80,- 30 -
240 ff)/ e.g., the common sense absurdity of the terms used
in Becker's economics of the family is reason enough to dis-
card the theory as a trivial ex-post rationalization of
observed phenomena. Of course, such a judgement shifts the
problem to the question whether and to what extent common
sense can really help us to evaluate economic theories. Or,
more fundamentally: What is the point in an observed phenomenon
like, say, marriage which makes it unaccessible to economic
analysis? Some criteria like "explicitness" of the rational
calculus, i.e. some business-like attitude on the part of the
acting agents may be indispensible if we want to draw a
sensible line between economic and non-economic fields. If
non-Chicagoens are not able to develop a set of criteria for
this line, there will be no point in criticizing the methodo-
logical imperialism of Chicago economics.
5. The Purpose and Limits of Empirical Research
Given the attitude of the two schools with respect to equi-
librium economics, their views on empirical research, notably
econometrics, can hardly be regarded as independent metho-
dological tenants. This is why we shall be brief on this
subject.
5.1. The Austrian School: Vague Scepticism
As econometrics at its present stage of development could
be defined as the estimation of parameters of structural or
reduced-form equations which are derived from static equi-
librium theory , we should expect Austrians to reject eco-
nometrics on the ground that mainstream equilibrium economics
This ad-hoc definition excludes statistical time series
analysis to the extent that it contains no terms derived
from economic theory.- 31 -
itself is deficient: estimating structural parameters of an
economy which is supposed to be in a "perpetual Austrian
disequilibrium process" is a futile exercise, simply because,
in such an economy, there are no static, time invariant
relations.
In fact, this appears to be the actual Austrian position
although the few pointed statements addressing the scope
of econometric research in Austrian writings are not un-
ambiguous.
To quote von Mises:
"... 'correlations' and 'functions' do not describe anything
else than what happened at a definite instant of time in a
definite geographical area as the outcome of the actions of
a definite number of people." (v. Mises, 19 77, p. 63)
A similar argument is made by Mario Rizzo in a recent paper
on the role of econometrics:
"... it is important not to interpret econometrically de-
rived relations as great constants applicable to all situa-
tions at all times. These relations are not theoretical
but merely historical. To extrapolate the latter to the
former requires an inductive leap that we are not prepared
to take." (Rizzo 1978, p. 53)
As far as these statements can be interpreted in the above
sense, they certainly contain the germ for a sensible
Austrian critique of quantitative methods. However, taken
at face value, they apparently point to a view of econo-
metrics as just another pseudo-science of historicism, i.e.
another futile attempt to reveal some eternal laws in the
quantitative pattern of history. By all means, such a critique
grossly mistakes the scope of econometrics, lihile the seduc-
tion to make careless use of econometric models for fore-
casting and simulation purposes cannot be denied, there is
certainly no "inductive leap" involvedj to the contrary,
econometrics is and has to be based on the hypothetico-
deductiye models of economic theory; it cannot simply draw
on the pool of available data to form ad-hoc variables and- 32 -
correlate them in theoretically empty regressions. But if
econometrics is not theoretically empty, then a critique of
econometrics must begin with a critique of current economic
theory.
5.2. The Chicago School: Sophisticated Econometrics
Clearly, the firm reliance on tight prior equilibrium theo-
rizing does not foster any anti-empirical attitude. To the
contrary, there has always been a fair amount of (positivist)
Chicago optimism with respect to the performance of empirical
research. Again, Milton Friedman's methodological essay
yields a good case in point:
"... differences about economic policy among disinterested
citizens derive predominantly from different predictions
about the economic consequences'of taking action - differences
that in principle can be eliminated by the progress of posi-
tive economics - rather than from fundamental differences
in basic values, differences about which men can ultimately
only fight." (Friedman 1953, p. 5)
However, with the shift from the older Chicago School around
Milton Friedman to the modern School (notably Robert E. Lucas),
this optimism has been somewhat shaken; it is now replaced
by a critical - albeit not at all anti-empirical - attitude
which has found its most intriguing expression in Lucas' funda-
mental critique of the performance of econometric macro
models:
"... given that the structure of an econometric model con-
sists of optimal decision rules of economic agents, and that
optimal decision rules vary systematically with changes in
the structure of series relevant to the decision maker,
it follows that any change in policy will systematically
alter the structure of econometric models." (Lucas 1976 (I),
p. 126)
The consequences for policy evaluation on basis of traditional
econometric models are devastating:- 33 -
"... comparisons of the effects of alternative policy rules
using current macroeconomic models are invalid regardless of
the performance of these models over the sample period or in
ex ante short-term forecasting." (Lucas 1976 (I), p. 126)
Note that this critique is, at base, a theoretical critique,
i.e. a critique of those theoretical models which do not
assume that economic agents use available information effi-
ciently. Or, to put it positively: It is a plea for theo-
retical expectations. Any econometric work based on tight
prior equilibrium theorizing (which includes the assumption
of rational expectations) is exempted from Lucas
1 objections
Thus his argument is not directed against econometric re-
search as such, but rather against 'naive
1 econometric model
building along the keynesian lines in the 1950's and 1960's.
6. Final Remarks
We are left with the challenging question of why two schools
so vastly different on methodological grounds arrive at vir-
tually identical economic policy prescriptions. Without dis-
cussing the interesting details of this question, we may ven-
ture to say that the clue to the answer will lie in the views
of both schools on equilibrium economics.
In the Austrian view of the market as a ceaseless process of
discovery and information dissemination, there is no single
individual and no board of directors who knows how the rela-
tive scarcity of goods will look like in the future. Granted
this premise, it must be unwise to put the power of resource
allocation into the hands of some committee, even if it is
a democratically elected one; instead, it is much better to
rely on the independant efforts of all private economic agents
who are likely to have access to the best feasible - albeit
still far from perfect - information in the small sector of
society in which they live, work and make decisions. As pri-- 34 -
vate agents are bound to search for new information on the
changing pattern of relative prices in an optimizing fashion,
a decentralized system will ensure the most rapid possible
growth of knowledge. Hence setting up a stable institutio-
nal framework and letting the simultaneous adjustment of
all private economic agents proceed on its own is the best
way to promote progress in the sense of daring leaps into
the unknown.
Thight prior equilibrium theorizing along Chicago lines has
similar consequences for policy making: If markets can right-
ly be assumed to work efficiently (including the efficient
use of available information), there is simply no rationale
for government intervention apart from setting up a stable
institutional framework (including an unambiguous definition
of property rights).
In summary, we see dynamic optimality behind the Austrian-,
and static optimality behind the Chicago-plea for laissez-
faire and negative freedom in general. A glance over the ideo-
logical 'bibles' of the two schools, von Hayek's "The Con-
stitution of Liberty" (1960) and Milton Friedman's "Capitalism
and Freedom" (1962), supports this conjecture: While Friedman
is mostly concerned with demonstrating the allocative effi-
ciency of free capitalism, von Hayek's emphasis lies much
more on the informational dynamics of the system. Still then:
While both authors;like to underline their case for freedom
by distinct welfare economic arguments, they would probably
not consider either of these arguments as being necessary
and/or sufficient conditions for negative freedom to be
desirable. It would be most revealing to ask both authors
whether they would still favour a maximum possible degree of
negative freedom if it were 'proved
1 that freedom does not
It is unclear what normative significance should be attached
to the recent Chicago research on political equilibria. So
far, it seems, the normative stance of the Chicago School has
not been shattered by this new strand of positive economics.- 35 -
promote either static allocative efficiency or the growth
of knowledge. I guess that both would cling? to freedom, and
thus implicitly declare their books as "essays in persuasion"
which are intended to convince the world that freedom is not
only desirable as an end in itself, but also as a means to
achieve a lot of other nice things. Hence, as an ideological
pillar of dogmatic liberalism, methodology may well play a
minor part.- 36 -
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